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ANTITRUST AND THE JUDICIAL VIRTUES
Daniel A. Crane*
Although commentators frequently debate how judges
should decide antitrust cases substantively, little attention
has been paid to theories of judicial virtue in antitrust
decision making. This essay considers four pairings of
virtues: (1) striving for substantive purity versus conceding to
institutional realism; (2) incrementalism versus generalism;
(3) presenting a unified face versus candidly conceding
differences among judges on an appellate panel; and (4)
adhering strictly to stare decisis versus freely updating
precedents to reflect evolving economic learning or conditions.
While recognizing the complexities that sometimes pull judges
in the opposite direction, this Article gives the nod to
institutional realism, incrementalism, candor, and relatively
unconstrained updating of precedent.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's recent decision' on the Affordable
Health Care Act,2 and Chief Justice John Roberts's plurality
opinion upholding the individual mandate in particular,
have reignited the conversation over judicial virtues. Some
view Roberts's recharacterization of the individual mandate,
as a tax, as a cheap parlor trick designed to protect the
Chiefs personal legacy at the expense of principle. Others
view the same move as a statesman-like measure to restore
the Court's legitimacy, badly damaged by the partisan divide
in Bush v. Gore.3 Given the importance of the case, these
debates will likely continue for some time.
The participants in this debate share a common
assumption that there are such things as judicial virtues
(such as "principle" or "statesmanship") that command
adherence regardless of the stakes in any particular case.
But even if the virtues do not vary by the stakes in any case,
their relative importance surely varies by the context of a
decision. The virtues most important to good judging in the
context of, say, constitutional skirmishes between Congress
and the President, are likely somewhat different than the
virtues most important to resolution of breach of contract
cases, the construction of statutes, the interpretation of wills,
or the sentencing of criminal defendants.
In sorting through the catalogue of potential virtues and
figuring out which ones are most important where, one
should keep in mind that the prioritization of any one virtue
usually means the demotion of another. The legal realist
Karl Llewellyn famously argued that canons of statutory
interpretation hunt in pairs, that "there are two opposing
canons on almost every point."' The same is arguably true of
1 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
2 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119 (2010).
3 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
4 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions
and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND.
L. REV. 395, 401 (1950). But see ANTONIN ScALiA, A MATTER OF
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judicial virtues. For many virtues, there is arguably an
equal and opposite virtue. Thus, for example, "temperance"
and "boldness" are both virtues when applied to judging, yet
they could often be used to describe opposing possible
treatments of a particular case.
I propose in this essay to consider judicial virtues and
antitrust adjudication-to ask which virtues are most
conducive to "good judging" in antitrust cases in the
contemporary American context. To that end, I first situate
the process of antitrust adjudication within the broader
project of adjudication. It is well understood that antitrust
adjudication is largely a common law process, but common
law adjudication comes in a variety of forms and contexts.
Therefore, fleshing out the nature of antitrust's common law
process sheds light on the question of judicial virtues.
I then turn to four pairings of possible virtues: (1)
substantive purism versus institutional realism; (2)
incrementalism versus generalism; (3) harmony versus
candor; and (4) adherence to precedent versus keeping up
with the times. Each pairing reflects a tension about how
judges should decide antitrust cases. With antitrust's
common law nature as a backdrop, I discuss the relative
prioritization of these virtues in the decision of antitrust
cases.
II. CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, AND THE
COMMON LAW
Theories of good judging abound. Most of them relate to
one of three contexts in which judges are often called upon to
make decisions: constitutional questions, statutory
interpretation, or common law reasoning. None of these
contexts, in their pure forms, fits the model of contemporary
antitrust.
Contemporary theories of good constitutional judging
usually play in the shadows of what Alexander Bickel called
the countermajoritarian difficulty-the fact that judges are
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 26-27 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997) (disputing Llewellyn's characterization of the canons).
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unelected, democratically unaccountable actors who wield
the power to invalidate the public will at some peril.5 In
light of that difficulty, Bickel argued that some of the most
important judicial virtues were the passive ones-the virtue
of not deciding cases at all by withholding adjudication until
a later date.'
Antitrust law is not plagued by a substantial
countermajoritarian difficulty and thus presents no reason
for judges to exercise passive or avoidant virtues. Judges
making antitrust law do not have to worry that their
decisions will trump the popular will, except in the limited
sense that they may reject suits by public enforcers like the
Justice Department or Federal Trade Commission ("FTC").
To the extent that judges promulgate legal norms different
from those favored by the executive branch, a small
countermajoritarian difficulty is presented. But since
judicial antitrust decisions are theoretically reversible by
Congress, the courts do not have the final word on antitrust
questions, as they do in constitutional cases. There is
therefore little reason for judges to worry that their decisions
in antitrust cases will compromise the legitimacy of the
courts by undermining popular will.
Antitrust adjudication also does not fit into the broad
debate over appropriate judicial approaches to statutory
interpretation. Theorists of statutory interpretation often
conceive of statutory interpretation as a dialogue between
the courts and Congress, where the courts attempt to divine
legislative intent through a variety of textual or
intentionalist tools, and Congress responds by amending the
statute or ratifying the judicial interpretation through
inaction. But this does not describe antitrust adjudication,
for two reasons.
First, the important operative sections of the antitrust
laws-Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (the
"Sherman Act"), Sections 2, 3, 4, and 7 of the Clayton Act,
5 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1986).
6 Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term Foreword: The
Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REV. 40 (1961).
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and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act-are so
sparsely worded and open-textured that the courts have
made no serious effort at interpretation since Justice
Peckam's misguided formalism in Trans-Missouri,7 with the
possible exception of some early efforts to spell out
Congress's intent in the Celler-Kefauver amendments to the
Clayton Act.8 During the 1970s and 80s, there was a
vigorous debate over what, based on the legislative history of
the Sherman Act, Congress intended the purpose of the
statute to be. 9  However, the legislative history is
inconclusive at best, and confounding at worst.10 Antitrust
courts are rarely involved in questions of statutory
interpretation. Even the broader category of construction,
7 United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 312 (1897)
(holding that the text of Section 1 of the Sherman Act categorically
prohibits all restraints of trade without regard to their reasonableness).
8 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 311-23 (1962)
(enunciating seven points of legislative intent in the passage of the Celler-
Kefauver Act).
9 Compare Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the
Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966) (arguing that Congress was
primarily concerned with promoting economic efficiency), with Robert H.
Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65
(1982) (arguing that Congress was primarily concerned about wealth
transfers from consumers to producers).
10 See Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 815 (2002) (describing the Sherman Act's
legislative history as indeterminate); Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the
Normative Functions of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 232
(1995) (describing some academics' views that the Sherman Act's
legislative history is "confused"); Paul E. Levine, Note, Attempt to
Monopolize Under the Sherman Act: Defendant's Market Power as a
Requisite to a Prima Facie Case, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1451, 1452 n.9 (1973)
("The legislative history of the Sherman Act is so inconclusive as to be
useless in the disposition of litigation arising under it."); see also 1 PHILLIP
E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 61 (3d ed. 2006) ("Taking
the legislative history of the antitrust laws as a whole, we would give it
relatively little weight on the fundamental question of whether economic
efficiency, injury to competitors, or some alternative 'populist' goal should
guide antitrust policy.").
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which imagines the courts as applying statutory meanings in
concrete circumstances," does not fit the antitrust
enterprise. The antitrust statutes are widely recognized as
open-ended delegations to the courts to create a common law
of competition.12
A second reason that the judicial virtues associated with
statutory interpretation have little relevance to antitrust
adjudication is that Congress so rarely responds to judicial
decisions by amending the antitrust laws. The last
significant substantive amendments to the antitrust laws
were the Celler-Kefauver amendments to the merger statute
in 1950.13 Although there have been occasional threats of
congressional action to overrule unpopular decisions, such as
Leegin's overruling of Dr. Miles, such threats have usually
gone nowhere. 14  In 2007, the bipartisan, congressionally-
11 See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION:
DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 1-2 (1999); Randy E.
Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 65
(2011) (discussing the distinction between construction and
interpretation).
12 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR
WITH ITSELF 409 (1978) (describing the "open-textured" nature of the
Sherman Act's language).
13 There have been several important largely procedural or
jurisdictional amendments to the antitrust laws since 1950. See
Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45 (2011)) (repealing the Miller-
Tydings Act, which allowed states to enact minimum resale price
maintenance laws); Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (requiring premerger notification,
expanding the Justice Department's civil investigatory powers, and giving
states parens patriae standing); Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a
(2011)) (specifying the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act to foreign
commerce).
14 Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373
(1911). In the modern era, Congress has shown little interest in
overturning Supreme Court antitrust precedents, as it has done in many
other statutory areas. Following the Court's decision in Leegin, which
jettisoned a nearly century-old rule of per se illegality for resale price
maintenance, there were congressional threats of a legislative override.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
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appointed Antitrust Modernization Commission made a
variety of recommendations for legislative amendments to
the antitrust laws,1" ranging from repealing the Robinson-
Patman Act to creating a statutory solution to the vexing
problem of indirect purchaser standing. None of these
recommendations has gained significant legislative traction.
Very little antitrust adjudication turns on the meaning of
statutes or the expressed or unexpressed will of Congress.
It is de rigueur to recognize that antitrust adjudication is
a common law process. 6 But what sort of common law? It is
not the historic common law where judges developed
substantive and procedural legal doctrines largely free from
a statutory framework. Judges make modern antitrust law
work within a procedural and remedial framework
established by statute. They create law enforceable both
publicly and privately with both criminal and civil
Leegin-override legislation has passed committees in both houses of
Congress, but has thus far failed to gain traction in the full Congress. Cf.
Joanna Anderson, Effort to Ban "Vertical Price-Fixing" Wins Panel's
Approval, CQ ROLL CALL, Nov. 3, 2011, http://www.cqtoday.com/doc/
committees-2011110300292061?wr=bzR2QWhQbmtjMG5tSk9KQjN
sbmlKUQ.
15 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2007), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edulamc/
reportrecommendation/amcfinal-report.pdf.
16 See Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688
(1978) ("Congress . . . did not intend the text of the Sherman Act to
delineate the full meaning of the statute or its application in concrete
situations. The legislative history makes it perfectly clear that [Congress]
expected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad mandate by
drawing on common-law tradition."); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note
10, at 62 (stating that the Sherman Act "invest[ed] the federal courts with
a jurisdiction to create and develop an 'antitrust law' in the manner of the
common law courts"); William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers,
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Common Law" Nature of Antitrust Law,
60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 663 (1982) ("Congress adopted what is in essence
enabling legislation that has permitted a common-law refinement of
antitrust law through an evolution guided by only the most general
statutory directions."); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983) ("The statute books are full of laws, of which
the Sherman Act is a good example, that effectively authorize courts to
create new lines of common law.").
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application. They work in the shadow of an executive and an
administrative agency with concurrent jurisdiction to enforce
and shape the antitrust laws. They purport to follow a
"consumer welfare" norm ostensibly established by
Congress."
Antitrust common law also bears little relation to popular
theories of federal common law, such as the theory espoused
in Guido Calabresi's A Common Law for the Age of
Statutes.18  Calabresi urges courts to exercise "the judicial
power to force legislative agendas" to interpret or to
invalidate statutes that are seen to be inconsistent with the
"legal topography" of the times, thus forcing legislators to
reengage the relevant statutory terrain to the benefit of
democracy and law.19 As already noted, antitrust courts are
not generally engaged in a dialogue with Congress, in either
interpreting or invalidating statutes.
Antitrust adjudication is a differentiated subspecies of
common law. It therefore calls for a somewhat different set
of judicial virtues than those called for in constitutional
adjudication, statutory interpretation, or conventional
common law circumstances.
III. VIRTUES THAT HUNT IN PAIRS
A. Substantive Purism vs. Institutional Realism
Our first pairing of equal and opposite judicial virtues is
what I will call substantive purism and institutional realism.
Substantive purism can be defined as the view that judges
should decide cases entirely on their substantive merits,
without worrying about the consequences of a decision for
the legal and political institutions implicated, or trying to
adjust the substantive rule to fit the relative strengths and
weaknesses of the different institutional actors involved in
17 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (attributing to
Congress a consumer welfare goal in the adoption of the antitrust laws).
18 GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
19 Id. at 18, 120.
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antitrust adjudication. Institutional realism, by contrast, is
the view that judges should formulate substantive legal rules
by taking consideration of the systemic effects of different
substantive rules along with the competencies of trial judges,
appellate judges, lawyers, experts, juries, legislators,
agencies, and other actors in the system.
A clash between substantive purism and institutional
realism can be seen in the divide between the majority and
dissenting opinions in the two most important antitrust
cases on the summary judgment and motion to dismiss
standards, respectively-Matsushita 20  and Twombly.21
Matsushita involved a claim by American television
manufacturers that their Japanese competitors had engaged
in a prolonged predatory pricing conspiracy in the United
States.2 2 During the course of litigation, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit entertained an appeal from a
pretrial order of the district court holding that parties to
antitrust cases have an automatic right to a jury trial.2 3
While not deciding whether there was a jury trial right in
the Matsushita case, the Third Circuit held that a party does
not have a Seventh Amendment right to jury trial in an
antitrust case if the trial would be so complex that the jury
could not rationally perform its function. 24 That provocative
decision never reached the Supreme Court because it was
preempted by summary judgment. After rejecting the
defendants' motion to strike the plaintiffs' jury trial demand,
the district court entered summary judgment for the
defendants on the merits.25
The Court's decision in Matsushita is widely understood
as asking district courts to make liberal use of summary
20 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986).
21 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
22 See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 577, 584.
23 See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069,
1071-72 (3d Cir. 1980).
24 See id. at 1086, 1090-91.
25 See id. at 1073 n.4; Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., 494 F. Supp. 1190, 1203, 1241-42 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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judgment in complex antitrust cases in order to avoid poor
decision making by juries. The majority presented a lengthy
theoretical argument that predatory pricing is generally an
unprofitable and unlikely strategy for a group of oligopolists
who have to share the high cost of predation." Thus, in the
majority's view the plaintiffs' claim was implausible.2 7
Implausible did not mean impossible, and the Court
recognized the possibility that the plaintiffs' theory might
actually be true.2 8 Consistent with the Chicago School error-
cost framework,2 9 the majority apparently believed that
economic efficiency and consumer welfare would best be
served by adjudicatory rules that screen out false positives,
even at the cost of permitting some false negatives.
The majority's recognition that the plaintiffs' theory
might possibly be true was the point of departure for Justice
White's dissent. White argued that, in contravention of
longstanding summary judgment rules, the majority had
gone beyond asking whether there was a disputed issue of
material fact necessitating trial, but had actually weighed
the evidence and found the defendants' position more likely
to be right. 30 The majority's error, in White's view, was to
give dispositive weight to a particular economic theory about
the likelihood of collusive predatory pricing and require the
plaintiff to overcome a presumption that such conduct would
26 See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588-95 (concluding that the self-
deterrent effects of these strategic concerns will sufficiently counteract the
potential encouragement of such activities caused by courts granting
summary judgment in cases where plaintiffs offer only speculative or
ambiguous evidence of conspiracy).
27 Id. at 575.
28 See id. at 587 (holding that "if the factual context renders
respondents' claim implausible-if the claim is one that simply makes no
economic sense-respondents must come forward with more persuasive
evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary").
29 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV.
1, 3 (1984) (arguing that false positives are more costly than false
negatives in antitrust adjudication).
30 See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 600 (White, J., dissenting).
10 [Vol. 2013
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ordinarily not occur. Accordingly, the majority made
"assumptions that invade the factfinder's province."3 1
In Twombly, the Court extended this conversation to the
motion-to-dismiss context. The plaintiff class alleged that
incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs") had conspired
not to enter each other's local telephone and Internet service
markets in the manner contemplated by the 1996
Telecommunications Act.32 Justice Souter's majority opinion
affirmed the dismissal of the claims on the grounds that
plaintiffs failed to allege facts plausibly showing the
existence of a conspiracy. 33 Plaintiffs alleged only parallel
conduct-that the ILECs did not enter each other's
markets-but failed to allege facts making it plausible that
this parallel conduct evidenced the existence of a
conspiracy. 34 The majority emphasized the heavy costs to
litigants and the courts of allowing plaintiffs to pass the
motion-to-dismiss hurdle and obtain discovery on such thin
proof-really just suspicion-of conspiracy.3 5
Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion chastised the
majority for excessive institutional realism:
Two practical concerns presumably explain the
Court's dramatic departure from settled procedural
law. Private antitrust litigation can be enormously
expensive, and there is a risk that jurors may
mistakenly conclude that evidence of parallel conduct
has proved that the parties acted pursuant to an
agreement when thev in fact merely made similar
independent decisions.36
Justice Stevens argued that these concerns should be
addressed through careful management of the discovery
process and lucid jury instructions, but that they could not
31 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 601 (White, J., dissenting).
32 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-59 (2007).
33 Id. at 545.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 558-59.
36 Id. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
No. 1:1] I11
justify a departure from accepted pleading rules. 37 Justice
Souter's majority opinion implicitly accepted that these
institutional concerns motivated its decision.38
Putting aside the question of whether the institutional
concerns over excessive discovery and overwhelmed jurors
were accurate, were the justices in the Matsushita and
Twombly majorities justified in allowing their concerns over
the institutional realities of litigation to shape their
promulgation of the substantive norms on proof of conspiracy
to predate, and pleading conspiracy to divide markets? Or,
as urged by the dissenting justices, should the Court have
focused more on the substantive merits of the questions
before them?
In the last several decades, the U.S. courts have
displayed a high, but selective, degree of institutional
realism. As many commentators have shown, the courts
have been very willing to take into account some of the
perceived institutional weaknesses of the private antitrust
litigation system, such as juries overwhelmed by technical
economic reasoning, the chilling effects of treble damages
and class actions, and abusive suits by rent-seeking
competitors. 39  These institutionalist concerns, which have
often seen expression in the Harvard School perspective of
Justice Stephen Breyer and others,40 have as much
explanatory power in understanding the conservative fabric
37 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38 See id. at 559 (asserting that careful scrutiny of evidence at the
summary judgment stage and lucid jury instructions could not cure
discovery abuse problems).
39 The Court's institutional realism does not always appear on the
surface of the opinions. In neither Matsushita nor Twombly did the
majority overtly rest its decision on the institutionalist concerns that the
context of the decisions suggests were strongly influential. This may be
due in part to concerns that excessive candor about institutionalist
calculations suggests that judges are doing something other than deciding
pure questions of law.
40 See Daniel A. Crane, A Neo-Chicago Perspective on Antitrust
Institutions, 78 ANTITRUST L. J. 43, 45-46 (2012) (examining the influence
of the Neo-Harvard School perspective).
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of modern antitrust law as the more laissez-faire,
substantive views of Chicago School justices.
But this institutional realism has been selective. While
the courts have been willing to contract liability norms
because of concerns over the infirmities of private litigation,
they have been far less willing to expand liability norms in
government suits that arise in very different institutional
contexts, where juries, treble damages, class actions, and
abusive competitor suits are not at issue. For example, in
2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
rejected a private lawsuit challenging the legality of so-called
reverse payment settlements between a branded and a
generic drug company.41 There are several good reasons,
grounded in institutional limitations of private litigation, for
the rejection of that claim. But, two years later, when the
Court faced an FTC challenge to reverse payments, it
reflexively applied its prior private litigation precedent
without pausing to ponder whether the very different
institutional constraints in FTC litigation merited a different
consideration.4 2 Again in 2012, the Eleventh Circuit rejected
an FTC reverse payment challenge on the authority of the
framework established in its earlier decision in the private
case, and the Supreme Court has now granted certiorari to
resolve a circuit split on the issue.43 Rather than simply
challenging the original Eleventh Circuit decision in the
private lawsuit as wrongly decided, the FTC would be wise to
argue about how the institutional differences between public
agency and private enforcement should matter to the
outcome of the case.
Similar issues have arisen with respect to the FTC's
efforts to reinvigorate Section 5 of the FTC Act 44 as an
independent basis of authority to stop anticompetitive
behavior. To substantive purists, the FTC's efforts may look
41 Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir.
2003).
42 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005).
43 FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012),
cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 787 (Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-416).
44 Federal Trade Commission Act § 5; 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2011).
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like an affront to the rule of law, as former FTC Chairman
Bob Pitofsky has complained. To institutional realists,
however, it should make perfectly good sense that the
liability norms are broader in public cases than in private
ones. Hints in this direction have appeared in a few cases.
In linkLine, for example, Justice Breyer stated, without
explanation, that a price squeeze case, though properly
rejected in the private litigation context, might make
perfectly good sense as a government case.46
Institutional realism is a sound and necessary virtue in
the modern antitrust context. Congress created a remedial
structure for antitrust litigation and has shown little
appetite for amending it since 1914, despite radical changes
in the culture of private litigation and other institutional
dynamics since that time. Courts need to take into account
these realities and adapt the substantive law to suit them.
They should do so comprehensively rather than selectively,
however. Institutional realism should be observed both in
private and public suits.
B. Incrementalism vs. Generalism
The strength of the common law is its adaptive
incrementalism. Rather than starting from a general
principle and deducing applications, common law judges
arguably start from facts and work up to principles. This
inductive approach has the virtue of preventing judges from
announcing overbroad rules that work as to the facts of the
case before them, but fail in other, unanticipated
45 See Robert Pitofsky, Sheehy Professor of Antitrust Trade and
Regulation Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Panel Discussion at the FTC
Workshop on Section 5 of the FTC Act as a Competition Statute:
Interpretations of Section 5, at 59 (Oct. 17, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/section5/transcript.pdf.
46 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 458
(2009) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("A 'price squeeze' claim finds its natural
home in a Sherman Act [Section] 2 monopolization case where the
Government as plaintiff seeks to show that a defendant's monopoly power
rests, not upon 'skill, foresight and industry,'. . . but upon exclusionary
conduct.") (citation omitted).
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circumstances. It suggests that a certain degree of humility
and experientialism is the hallmark of good judging. As
Oliver Wendell Holmes famously remarked, "The life of the
law has not been logic: it has been experience."47
On the other hand, the common law method's cautious
incrementalism can be maddening to subjects of the law
trying to predict how courts will rule in the next case. When
courts take each case on its own facts, and refuse to
announce general principles governing all cases within the
relevant category, they make it difficult for people to predict
legal outcomes, which-to reference Justice Holmes again-
is the core of the legal enterprise.4 8 The unpredictability of
the incremental approach makes it hard for legal subjects to
order their lives and businesses.
The tension between generalism and incrementalism is
partly the inherent tension in law between rules and
standards. Antitrust law could be governed by broad
standards like the open-ended rule of reason, or by narrower
rules like the per se rule of illegality for price-fixing
agreements.49  But generalism and incrementalism raise
distinct questions from those presented in the rules and
standards discourse. A rule can be broad (e.g., no predatory
pricing liability absent a showing of pricing below marginal
cost) or narrow (e.g., no predatory pricing liability in airline
cases absent a showing of pricing below fully allocated
earnings plus upline/downline contribution net of costs).
Similarly, a standard can be broadly or narrowly applicable.
So the question with incrementalism and generalism is not
just whether the liability determinant should be flexible or
rigid, but whether the court should announce a rule of
decision narrowly tailored to the facts before it, or a more
47 OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
48 Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457,
457 (1897).
49 See Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis
in Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1214 (2008); Daniel A.
Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 49, 50 (2007).
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general principle intended to provide guidance in future
cases.
How do the conflicting impulses toward generalism or
incrementalism play out in the antitrust context? In recent
years, the tendency has been toward generalism, with a
number of prominent decisions attempting far-reaching
pronouncements on antitrust law.
Perhaps the best example of this is the D.C. Circuit's en
banc opinion in United States v. Microsoft,"o which is a rich
and widely cited opinion for a variety of reasons. The case
covered a broad range of technical, economic, and legal
issues, and was highly important to the information
technology sector, and the national economy more generally.
It also marked an opportunity for a broad statement about
antitrust principles governing unilateral exclusionary
conduct in the information economy, and it was decided en
banc by the most prestigious court in the land, other than
the Supreme Court. Given that commentators frequently
refer to the D.C. Circuit as ideologically polarized, the
Court's en banc unanimity was a remarkable achievement.
But the unanimity and generality of the opinion may
have come at the price of analytical incoherence, making the
Microsoft opinion-though often cited-relatively unhelpful
to the future adjudication of monopolization cases. The
decision has the feeling of a grand compromise that resolves
an important case and announces broad principles that have
little chance of guiding courts and litigants in the future.
Take, for example, the Microsoft court's announcement of
five principles of monopolization gleaned from "a century of
case law."5 1 The fourth principle is that "if the monopolist's
procompetitive justification stands unrebutted, then the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm of
the conduct outweighs the procompetitive benefit."52 This
suggests that antitrust courts, which in most civil cases
means juries, should be asked to weigh the benefits of
50 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en
banc) (per curiam).
51 Id. at 58-59.
52 Id. at 59.
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undisputedly procompetitive behavior, such as the
development and introduction of new products, against the
behavior's anticompetitive effects. I seriously doubt that
most judges on the D.C. Circuit, or any other court, would be
comfortable having juries make such determinations. As a
panel of the D.C. Circuit recognized in the earlier Microsoft
decision, "[a]ntitrust scholars have long recognized the
undesirability of having courts oversee product design, and
any dampening of technological innovation would be at cross-
purposes with antitrust law."6" Further-as scholars have
noted-although announcing a general balancing test, there
was no occasion on which the Microsoft court found that an
act was prima facie exclusionary, that Microsoft had offered
a procompetitive justification for the conduct, and then
proceeded to balance the procompetitive virtue against the
anticompetitive effect in any meaningful way.54 Once the
court found that Microsoft had satisfied its burden of proving
a procompetitive justification, it uniformly held that practice
legal without engaging in balancing.
But this has not stopped lower courts from citing
Microsoft for the proposition that monopolization cases
require balancing the procompetitive virtues of new products
53 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 948 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
54 See, e.g., Spencer W. Waller, The Past, Present, and Future of
Monopolization Remedies, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 11, 23 (2009); Yane Svetiev,
Antitrust Governance: The New Wave of Antitrust, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 593,
626-27 (2007). On one occasion, the court held that Microsoft had
presented a valid procompetitive justification for a contractual restriction,
and that this outweighed the alleged anticompetitive effect. Microsoft, 253
F.3d at 63 ("We agree that a shell that automatically prevents the
Windows desktop from ever being seen by the user is a drastic alteration
of Microsoft's copyrighted work, and outweighs the marginal
anticompetitive effect of prohibiting the [Original Equipment
Manufacturers ("OEMs")] from substituting a different interface
automatically upon completion of the initial boot process."). However, the
court made no serious effort to explain the weighting of the competing
effects, and seems to have believed that there were no important
anticompetitive effects from requiring OEMs to show at least some of
Microsoft's copyrighted Windows interface upon booting of the operating
system.
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against their anticompetitive effects. 5 Other courts have
felt obliged to express quiet disagreement with the
suggestion that balancing of procompetitive benefits and
anticompetitive effects is required, pointing back to the D.C.
Circuit's 1998 Microsoft opinion.56 Litigants often spar at
length over the meaning of Microsoft, picking and choosing
from different corners of the opinion to justify their positions.
Much of this could have been avoided if the D.C. Circuit had
hewn more closely to the controversy before it, instead of
reaching out to express a grand unifying theory of Section 2
of the Sherman Act.
Expressing broad principles of antitrust law might be
more expedient if the broad principles expressed were highly
predictive of future results, and hence allowed firms and
litigants to better organize their activities and predict
judicial outcomes. For better or worse, most efforts at
generalization in antitrust have done little to help predict
the next decision, and have instead invited diversion of
resources into esoteric debates over the meaning of the
general principle. Although there is a time and place for
antitrust generality, judges deciding antitrust cases would
be well advised to follow the incrementalist virtue in most
cases.
A distinction might be drawn here between rules and
frameworks for decision. Anticipating the pairing of virtues
that follows, it is often desirable-and consistent with the
55 See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d
408, 422 (D. Del. 2006) ("Contrary to Defendants' assertion, Plaintiffs are
not required to prove that the new formulations were absolutely no better
than the prior version or that the only purpose of the innovation was to
eliminate the complementary product of a rival. Rather, as in Microsoft, if
Plaintiffs show anticompetitive harm from the formulation changes, that
harm will be weighed against any benefits presented by Defendants.").
56 See, e.g., Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care
Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 1000 (9th Cir. 2010) ("There is no room in this
analysis for balancing the benefits or worth of a product improvement
against its anticompetitive effects. If a monopolist's design change is an
improvement, it is 'necessarily tolerated by the antitrust laws,' . . . unless
the monopolist abuses or leverages its monopoly power in some other way
when introducing the product.") (citation omitted).
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longstanding culture of common-law judging-for judges to
make clear their working assumptions and decisional
frameworks. For example, as already noted, Chicago School
judges have been heavily influenced by Frank Easterbrook's
error-cost framework, and have explicitly cited his
influence.5 ' The error-cost framework is a broad principle
with far-reaching implications for antitrust adjudication, and
understanding its influence on judges is helpful to litigants
and other consumers of legal decisions. It would be a
mistake, however, for judges to invoke the error-cost
framework to announce antitrust rules too far removed from
the specific facts in controversy. Incrementalism in the
announcement of liability rules can and should co-exist with
transparency concerning overall decisional frameworks.
C. Harmony vs. Candor
The judiciary seems to be at the zenith of its strength
when the panel of judges hearing a case speaks with a single
voice. The Supreme Court's unanimity in Brown v. Board of
Education5 8 remains legendary as an example of judicial
ability to move forward an important social agenda in the
face of virulent opposition. Many judges believe that they
should concede on minor points of disagreement and sign
onto opinions that are not fully theirs in order to preserve
the institutional position of the court. On the other hand,
grumbling concurrences and dissents have a long and storied
history in the Anglo-American tradition. When it comes to
antitrust cases, which virtue is more important? Presenting
a slightly misleading unified front and thereby preserving
harmony, or letting it all hang out?
Some of the most important antitrust opinions of the last
few decades have been studies in harmony. Consider the
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Trinko, which drew
57 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209, 233 (1993); Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S.
328, 345 (1990); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 591 n.15 (1986).
58 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
ANTITRUST AND THE JUDICIAL VIRTUES 19No. 1: 1]
no dissent. 9 Clearly, the superficial harmony of the opinion
masked unresolved tensions between the judges who signed
onto the opinion.
The big story of Trinko was that Justice Scalia could
write a consummately Chicago School opinion in which the
consummately Harvard School Justice Breyer could also join.
The opinion is extraordinary in its versatility and
contradictions. On the one hand, it celebrates monopoly,
indulging in a sublime triple negative to explain that "[t]he
mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant
charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an
important element of the free-market system." 0 On the
other hand, it celebrates the presence of a command-and-
control regulatory structure designed to eliminate market
power in telecommunications networks. 1 On the one hand,
it interprets the Telecommunication Act's antitrust savings
clause as preventing reliance on that Act to answer the
antitrust question through the implied repeal doctrine. On
the other hand, it finds the presence of the statutory scheme
significant in finding the absence of a duty to deal. On the
one hand it disparages Aspen Skiing to the point of
overruling.64 On the other hand it treats Aspen Skiing as an
authoritative set of principles about duties to deal. On the
one hand, it belabors the risks of false positives-finding
that the defendant should be obliged to share its network
59 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398 (2004). Three justices-Stevens, Souter, and Thomas-concurred
in the judgment, not because they necessarily disagreed with the
majority's opinion, but because they would have resolved the case by
finding plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the relevant claim. Id. at 416-
17.
60 Id. at 407.
61 See id. at 401.
62 Id. at 406.
63 Id. at 407-08.
64 Id. at 408-09 (citing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 601 (1985)).
65 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 410 (2004).
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when good economic theory suggests it should not.66 On the
other, it celebrates the presence of regulators who can order
the defendant to share its network with rivals.6 7
Like Microsoft, which suffers from overgenerality, Trinko
suffers from overinclusiveness. True, the complex of factors
discussed in the opinion amounted to a victory for the
defendant on this particular day. However, it would be a
mistake to read Trinko as an appreciation note from Justice
Breyer to monopolists, or from Justice Scalia to regulators.
When just regulators alone are at issue, we get cases like
FDA v. Brown & Williamson, holding that the FDA lacked
authority to regulate tobacco, with Scalia in the majority and
Breyer in the dissent; 8 or California Dental Association v.
FTC, in which the Chicago School justices joined the
majority opinion overruling the FTC's efforts to prevent
restrictions on dental care advertising; and Justice Breyer
dissented, arguing that the FTC, the expert agency on
advertising, should receive deference.69
A decision with less harmony but more candor is the
aforementioned linkLine decision. 70 All nine justices voted
against price squeeze liability on the facts of the case, but
four justices, led by Justice Breyer, concurred in the
judgment in order to draw out their distinctive perspective.
For the five justices in the majority, price squeeze liability
simply is unavailable under the authority of the duty to deal
(Trinko) and predatory pricing (Brooke Group) cases, not to
mention the pro-monopolist thematics of Trinko.71 For the
Breyer group, price squeeze liability might be available in a
different institutional context-particularly where the
government was the plaintiff, or where regulators had failed
to control the exercise of monopoly power. [L]inkLine is less
of an achievement than Trinko in putting together a
66 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414.
67 Id. at 413.
68 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
69 Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
70 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009).
71 See Trinko, 540 U.S. 398; Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
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harmonious coalition, but it serves as a far better
identification and exposition of the real views on the court
today, and is thus much more helpful in predicting how cases
will be decided in the future.
In Trinko and Microsoft, the judges spoke with a unified
voice, politely papering over their deep differences. There is
a moment for such harmony, particularly in cases like Brown
v. Board of Education," where the political legitimacy,
independence, and power of the Court would be instantly
challenged by powerful reactionary forces. One could only
wish that the Supreme Court could have spoken with an
equally unified voice in Bush v. Gore," whichever way the
decision came out. Thankfully, courts deciding antitrust
cases have few reasons to worry that their decisions will
provoke serious challenges to their legitimacy, independence,
or power. Given the luxury of relative indifference to their
decisions in the general population, and even among the
political elite, antitrust judges may, and often should,
candidly disclose their differences.
D. Adherence to Precedent vs. Keeping Up with the
Times
A final pairing of virtues concerns the tension between
adhering to precedent and keeping up with the times-or,
perhaps, developments in economic theory and business
experience. Stare decisis applies to antitrust as to other
fields, but to what degree? The poster child for the stare
decisis doctrine is an antitrust case, Flood v. Kuhn, in which
the Supreme Court upheld baseball's antitrust exemption
even though the original justifications for that exemption
had long since evaporated.74 Flood reduces to the
proposition that some principles stand the test of time not
because they continue to have persuasive power but merely
because they have been repeated so many times. But, of
course, not everyone appreciates the continuing wisdom of
72 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
73 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
74 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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the baseball antitrust exemption, particularly when 'MLB"
stands as much for Major League Business as Major League
Baseball," and sports like football, basketball, hockey, and
soccer, which are economically indistinguishable from
baseball, face full antitrust scrutiny. Under one view,
antitrust is precisely the sort of common law field in which
courts should feel the maximum latitude to update out-of-
date precedents.
No case better tees up two contrasting visions of antitrust
stare decisis than Leegin, which jettisoned a ninety-six-year-
old rule of per se illegality for vertical resale price
maintenance. Led by Justice Kennedy, the five justices
who voted to overrule Dr. Miles7 argued that stare decisis
considerations were weak because Dr. Miles relied on
outdated, formalistic common law conceptions, economic
theory had proven its foundational assumptions wrong, and
the surrounding legal rules governing maximum resale price
setting and non-price vertical restraints had been decided in
favor of the rule of reason in the intervening years. The
majority also noted that the common law nature of antitrust
adjudication permitted and, indeed, required the court to
reconsider the need for a per se rule.79
By contrast, Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion argued
that stare decisis required that the Court not so lightly
jettison Dr. Miles.a He argued that the "ordinary criteria for
overruling an earlier case" had not been met, since there had
been no change in circumstance warranting reconsideration
75 See Mike Ozanian, The Business of Baseball 2012, FORBES (Mar. 21,
2012, 12:27 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2012/03/21/ the-
business-of-baseball-2012 (reporting average revenue per MLB team of
$212 million).
76 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877
(2007).
77 Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373
(1911).
78 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 887-99.
79 Id. at 888-89.
s0 See id. at 908-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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of the earlier opinion. 1 Congress had not undertaken action
undermining Dr. Miles, nor had there been significant shifts
in the organization of American business that would call for
a different rule.8 2 As to the intervening economic literature,
the results were inconclusive at best.83  Breyer further
observed that Dr. Miles was not unworkable as a legal rule,
and that reliance on the rule of per se illegality pointed
against a sudden transition toward the rule of reason.84
One point that Justice Breyer made can be dismissed
rather quickly. Seeking to hoist Justice Scalia by his own
petard, Breyer notes that Scalia argued in an earlier case
that "the Court applies stare decisis more 'rigidly' in
statutory than in constitutional cases."85 Breyer then adds
that "[t]his is a statutory case."86 As noted earlier, however,
antitrust cases are not "statutory" in the ordinary sense,
since they involve no question of statutory interpretation and
very little "dialogue" with Congress. Antitrust cases much
more closely resemble common law adjudication, where the
courts form norms over time. Scholars have often
distinguished between the importance of stare decisis in
statutory interpretation-where legislative will is at issue-
and in common law cases, where it is not."
As a form of common law adjudication, antitrust law is
subject to the inherent tension in the common law over
questions of legitimacy and reform. The political legitimacy
of the common law is predicated on judges' ostensible
adherence to precedent. Judges, who are not politically
accountable or representative, can claim legitimacy in
81 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 918-19 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
82 Id. at 919-20.
83 Id. at 920.
84 Id. at 924.
85 Id. at 923.
86 Id. at 924.
87 See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, Stare Decisis and Foreign Affairs,
61 DuKE L.J. 941, 960 (2012) (arguing that "the Supreme Court seemingly
has endorsed a more relaxed version of the doctrine of stare decisis when
courts take the lead in developing the law based on a corresponding
delegation of authority from Congress").
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"making law" since they are not just enacting their own
opinions but, in theory, following what judges in the past
have done. But this backward-looking orientation makes
reform and updating difficult. The great common law
reformers, like Justice Benjamin Cardozo, were ever juggling
to explain how their decisions were grounded in precedent,
even while subtly moving the ball forward.
But herein lies an important difference between antitrust
and non-statutory common law. Non-statutory common law
judges need to adhere closely to their precedents in part
because frequent or sudden upheavals in the law suggest
that judges enact their own preferences without objectivity
or constraint. By contrast, when judges create law pursuant
to a congressional delegation, they do so as agents of
Congress-as Congress's "junior partners." Even if Congress
does not frequently intervene, it can always overturn those
antitrust precedents of which it disapproves. The same is
only true in a limited sense for non-statutory common law.
Congress or state legislatures can, of course, alter the rules
of contract, tort, or property at will, but doing so invites the
criticism that the legislature is invading what has been the
province of the courts since time immemorial. It is politically
easier for Congress to overturn antitrust precedent, which is
its indirect creature, than to overturn non-statutory common
law precedents, which belong to others. Judges have
considerable freedom to modify their antitrust precedents
when they act explicitly as Congress' junior partners, finding
the source of their authority to create and modify antitrust
law in a congressional delegation, and serving in this role at
the pleasure of Congress.
Antitrust law cannot afford to remain riveted to the past.
Once the courts concluded that antitrust analysis should be
driven by consumer welfare and efficiency considerations,
retaining precedents like Dr. Miles, and similar cases that
were driven by other goals, made little sense. Economic
theory, business practice, market structures, and other
commercial realities require continual adaptation and
reconsideration of antitrust precedents. Congress has
delegated the responsibility of both forming and updating
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antitrust law to the courts, and has shown little interest in
doing this work itself. It therefore left the courts to review
and revise their precedents without much concern for past
decisions. Whatever the level of deference owed to precedent
in the context of statutory interpretation, stare decisis is less
important in the antitrust setting. A final observation: the
point just made-that courts should not be shy about
updating and modernizing antitrust law-may sound like an
endorsement of the Chicago School project of reversing the
interventionist and sometimes protectionist precedents that
limited commercial behavior in a wide variety of areas, such
as vertical price and non-price restraints, aggressive price
discounts, vertical and horizontal mergers, exclusive dealing,
and tying arrangements. But we are now in an area where
many of the Chicago School precedents, and the theoretic
assumptions on which they were based, are under attack in
the academy. As courts reevaluate the Chicago School
precedents, they should not feel particularly bound to them
by virtue of stare decisis. If the cases remain persuasive,
they should be retained. But if advances in economic
learning or the evolution of normative criteria through
common law iteration have undermined their force, they
should be jettisoned.
If all of this suggests that a troublesome level of
unconstrained judicial activism is permissible in antitrust,
observe that this kind of activism does not raise many of the
concerns associated with activism in other contexts,
particularly constitutional adjudication. As noted at the
outset, antitrust adjudication raises few, if any,
countermajoritarian difficulties. If by periodically
reinventing the meaning, purposes, and scope of the
antitrust laws judges are overriding the will of Congress, it
is the will of Congresses long past, and with the tacit
acquiescence of contemporary Congresses. But it is doubtful
that even transformative antitrust adjudication really
tramples on the will on past Congresses, since those past
Congresses expressed their will in such open-textured
delegations of authority to the courts.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Antitrust law occupies an idiosyncratic niche in the
federal statutory scheme. Congress has chosen to answer
few challenging questions of competition policy, largely
leaving them to the antitrust agencies and the courts.
Antitrust is no longer politically salient or closely monitored
by either the general populace or the political elite, as it was
during the first half of the twentieth century." With few
exceptions, antitrust law is the province of the courts.
This wide latitude calls for a distinct set of judicial
virtues in the antitrust space. Judges can afford to be
realistic about the institutional strengths and limitations of
the system with which Congress has entrusted them, and to
adapt substantive legal norms accordingly. They should
proceed incrementally and stepwise rather than trying to
organize the whole house at once. Judges should happily tell
us when they agree and tell us just as happily when they do
not. And judges should not be shy about reversing older
precedents when they no longer bear the force of reason or
fact. These virtues do not hold for all times and places; they
hold for U.S. antitrust in the twenty-first century.
88 See Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV.
1159 (2008).
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